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CRIMINAL LAW

Crawford at Two: Testimonial Hearsay
And the Confrontation Clause
by H. Patrick Furman

This column issponsored by the
CBA Criminal Law Section. It features articles written by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to
provide information about case law,
legislation, and advocacy affecting
the prosecution, defense, and administration of criminal cases in
Colorado state and federal courts.

Column Editors:
Leonard Frieling,a criminal defense
attorney in privatepractice,Boulder(303) 666-4064, lfrieling@lfrieling.
corn; and MorrisHoffman, ajudge
for the Second JudicialDistrict
Court,Denver

This article addresses the response of Colorado courts, and
that of certain other jurisdictions, to the 2004 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Crawford v. Washington.

On

preme Court handed down
1
March 8,
2004, the U.S.
SuCrawford
v. Washington,
significantly changing the landscape of hearsay law. Crawford established a new
rule by which a certain category of hearsay evidence offered against a criminal
defendant must be evaluated. "Testimonial hearsay" was deemed inadmissible
unless the defendant had an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was
made.
Since Crawford,virtually all state and
federal circuit courts have attempted to
delineate the precise boundaries of "testimonial hearsay." This article, on the
two-year anniversary of the Court's decision, provides an overview of many of
these cases, specifically focusing on Colorado opinions.

Crawford v. Washington
About The Author:
This month's articlewas written by
H. PatrickFurman,Boulder,Clinical
ProfessorofLaw at the University of
ColoradoSchool of Law-(303)
492-2638,furman@colorado.edu.
The authorwishes
to thank thirdyear student
Jessica Schmidt
for her valuable
assistance with
researchingand
writing this
article.

The facts of Crawford were simple.
The defendant was on trial for stabbing
a man he believed had raped his wife.
He claimed self defense. The trial court
admitted a tape-recorded statement,
made by the defendant's wife to police officers, that undercut the defense. The
wife did not testify at trial because of the
2
marital privilege.
The U.S. Supreme Court used this setting to re-evaluate the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to confront his
or her accusers. The Court determined
that the primary object of the amendment was to provide protection against
the improper admission of testimonial
statements.3 The Court held that when

"testimonial hearsay" is offered against
a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the witness be unavailable to testify and that the defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination
at the time the statement was
4
made.

Because the Supreme Court provided
little guidance for the application of the
"new" rule, lower courts have been struggling with the decision. Significantly, the
Court declined to explicitly define "testimonial hearsay," stating that it would instead"leave for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial."',

History of the
Confrontation Clause
The Court's analysis of the history of
the Confrontation Clause was central to
its decision that the Sixth Amendment
required more protection than had been
provided by previous decisions. The
Court conducted a comprehensive review of early English statutes, common
law, colonial practices, and early state
constitutions and decisions before concluding that this historical record supported two propositions. 6 First, it supported the proposition that the principal
evil addressed by the Confrontation
Clause was "the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused." 7 Second, this history supported the proposition that the
Framers would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial un-
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less the witness was unavailable to testify
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her.8
The central purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure that testimony introduced against an accused is reliable. 9
Although there are many ways to ensure
reliability-most hearsay exceptions are
based on reliability grounds--Crawford
held that the Confrontation Clause requires that reliability be established by
rigorous testing of the sort that occurs in
an adversary proceeding before a trier of
fact. 10 The American judicial system always has placed great value on cross examination as essential to determining the
truth of a matter. Crawford takes this a
step further and makes the opportunity to
cross-examine a precondition to the admission of certain types of hearsay statements.

What is Testimonial Hearsay?
Dictionary definitions served as a starting point for the Court when defining "testimonial hearsay" that might offend the
Confrontation Clause. The Court defined
"testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."'" The Court
also drew a distinction between formal
statements (which might be testimonial
hearsay) and casual remarks (which generally would not be testimonial hearsay):

"An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not." 2
The Court then listed three possible formulations of"testimonial hearsay":
1)"ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially";
2)"extrajudicial statements ... con-

tained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions";
and
3) "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial." 13
Although it did not explicitly adopt any of
these formulations, the Court noted that
they all "share a common nucleus." 14
The Court then provided examples of
statements that clearly are included within any of these formulations, stating that
"at a minimum," testimonial hearsay includes prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, at a prior trial, or before a grand

Crawford was based on the federal Confrontation Clause, but counsel may object on both federal and state constitutional grounds. Courts generally will not assume that an objection is based
on both constitutions; if one constitutional ground is not raised, that issue Will be deemed waived
unless the reviewing court finds that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to consider it sua
sponte.'
As this article makes clear, Colorado opinions suggest that the state constitutional protection is
identical to the Sixth Amendment protection. However, it should be noted that the Colorado Constitution uses different-and arguably stronger-language than the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him," and Article II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution guarantees the right of a defendant to
"meet the witnesses against him face to face." At least one court reviewing identical language in
another state constitution held that the language created a state constitutional protection greater
than that created by the federal Constitution. 2 This greater protection, however, did not result in
an expansion of the defendant's Crawford-type confrontation right.
A defendant's right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds also is limited by the continued
viability of the rule that defendants forfeit their constitutional right to confrontation with respect to
witnesses when their own behavior results in the witness's absence. 3 This rule has been applied
by Colorado courts. In People v. Moore, 4 the court of appeals refused to allow a defendant to
contest the introduction of excited utterances
made by his wife when his own actions caused her
5
death and rendered her unavailable.
1. United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2005).
2. State v. Malin, 2006 WL 120341 (Tenn. 2006).
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
4. People v. Moore, 117 R3d 1, 5 (Colo.App. 2004).
5. Id.
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jury, as well as police interrogations. 5
However, even this list of core statements
has significant limitations. For example,
the Court specifically defined statements
made in police interrogations as testimonial, but then stated that "Ulust as many
definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can
imagine various definitions of'interrogation."" 6

When Does

Crawford Apply?
Before trying to make sense of these
definitions and lists, practitioners first
must ask: does Crawfordeven apply to
the situation at hand? Crawforddoes not
apply to all criminal proceedings, because
the Sixth Amendment right to confront
one's accusers is a trial right.' Colorado
courts have held that Crawford does not
apply to sentencing hearings,' suppression hearings, 19 or probation violation

hearings.20 Other state and federal courts
have held that there is no confrontation21
right at, inter alia,preliminary hearings,
in camera hearings to determine why 22
a
witness refused to answer a question,
and post-conviction relief proceedings.n
Practitioners also should question
Crawford'sapplication when handling
cases decided before the Supreme Court's
24
opinion was issued. In Teague v. Lane,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "new
constitutional riles of criminal procedure"
are not applicable in cases where the conviction was final before the new rule was
announced, unless the new rule is a "watershed" rule.25 The definition of a "watershed rule" is very narrow and requires the
rule to fulfill two criteria: (1) "[i]nfringement of the rule must seriously diminish
the likelihood of obtaining an accurate
conviction"; and (2) "the rule must alter
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of
a proceeding." 26 Because the majority of
courts have concluded that Crawfordannounces a new rule, the struggle has been
over whether the new rule falls within the
"watershed" exception and should be applied retroactively.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held
that the Crawford rule does not apply to
cases involving convictions that became final before the decision was announced."
Crawford does apply retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal at the time the
decision was announced.2' Although a few
federal circuits have held that the Crawford rule is a watershed rule and may be
applied to post-conviction review, specifi-
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cally habeas review, the Tenth Circuit
joins the majority of circuits holding that
it does not.'

Finally, counsel must remember that
Crawford does not apply if the declarant
also testifies at trial; if a witness testifies,
there is no Crawford issue. Cross examination of the witness at trial is sufficient
30
for Confrontation Clause purposes.

Colorado's Analysis of
"Testimonial Hearsay"
The Colorado Court of Appeals has issued a number of opinions since Crawford, some of which are discussed below.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently issued People v. Vigil,31 which provides a
comprehensive review and analysis of
Crawford.
Vigil was convicted of sexual assault on
a child. The trial court had ruled that the
child was unavailable and admitted statements the child made (1) to his father and
to a friend of his father, which were
deemed admissible as excited utterances;
and (2) to a doctor, which were deemed
statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. 32 The Colorado

Supreme Court held that these were not
testimonial hearsay.33 The Court also implicitly adopted the court of appeals' conclusion that the child's statements to the
police were testimonial hearsay, but held
that the admission of those statements
was not plain error.34 In reaching these
conclusions, the Court created a two-part
analysis to determine whether statements are "testimonial" for Crawfordpurposes.

four categories. The child's statements to
the police clearly fall within the police interrogation category. The defendant argued that the child's statement to the doctor fell within the police interrogation category because the doctor was part of a
child protection team, was engaging in a
sexual assault examination, and knew
that the child's statements would be used
by the prosecution. The Court acknowledged that the police interrogation category does not require the actual involvement of the police; only the "functional
equivalent" of police interrogation is required. 36 However, the Court rejected the
argument that the doctor's questioning
was the functional equivalent of police interrogation in this case, noting that the
primary purpose of the doctor was to get
medical information, not to prepare testimony for use by the prosecution. Without
a "more direct and controlling police presence" the Court held that the doctor
should not be deemed a government offi3
cialY.
The Court also noted that the trial
court excised those portions of the child's
statements to the doctor that might be labeled "investigatory" and admitted only
those portions that were "diagnostic."38

Vigil Analysis: Part I
First, the trial court should determine
whether the statements fall within one of
the four specific categories of testimonial
hearsay defined by Crawford:
1) statements made in the course of a
preliminary hearing;
2) statements made in front of a grand
jury;
3) statements made at a prior trial; and
4) statements made 35
in the course of police interrogation.
If the statements fall within one of these
categories, the statements are testimonial.
The child's statements to his father and
his father's friend clearly fall outside these
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Vigil Analysis: Part H
The second half of the Vigil analysis
must be undertaken if the statements do
not fall within one of the four categories.
In that event, the trial court must determine whether the statements fall into one
of the three formulations of testimonial
39
hearsay that were set forth in Crawford.
In VWil, this analysis involved an evaluation of whether an objective witness
would reasonably believe that his or her
statement would be used later at trial; if
the witness so believed, the statements of
the witness are testimonial hearsay.40The
defendant argued that "objective witness"
means "an objectively reasonable adult
observer trained in the law," but the Court
rejected this interpretation and ruled that
"objective witness" means an "objectively
reasonable
person in the declarant's posi1
4

tion."

The Court used this interpretation to
analyze the child's statements to the doctor, as well as the statements to the child's
father and his father's friend. With respect
to the statements to the doctor, the Court
noted that the child was a 7-year-old who
was interested in feeling better, who expected that his statements to the doctor
would help him feel better, and who would
not foresee that his statements would be
used at a trial. With respect to the statements to the father and the father's
friend, the Court noted that the child
made these statements shortly after the
assault and was at home speaking informally to the two men. In the Court's estimation, an objectively reasonable person
in the declarant's position-that is, an objectively reasonable child-would assume
that the men were interested in finding
out what happened, determining wheth-

Prctc

Tip

Us

Roet

T

s fo

er the child was hurt, and comforting the
child. There was no indication that the
child thought that these statements were
any sort of attempt to develop testimony
for trial. Accordingly, the Court ruled that
the statements to the doctor, to the father,
and to the father's
friend were not testi42
monial hearsay.
Having determined that these statements did not run afoul of Crawford, the
Colorado Supreme Court also reviewed
the statements for admissibility under the
Colorado Confrontation Clause and determined them admissible under that standard, as well. People v.Dement 3 sets forth
the Colorado test and requires the prosecution to establish both that the witness
is unavailable and that the statement
bears sufficient indicia of reliability. Neither Crawford nor Vigil purports to alter
the manner in which this test is employed. A brief review of the Dement test
is provided in the accompanying sidebar
entitled "Practice Tip: Use Roberts Test for
Non-Testimonial Statements."

The Boundaries of
Testimonial Statements
Vigil, like Crawford,does not establish
the precise boundaries of "testimonial evidence." The Colorado Court ofAppeals has
addressed a number of specific fact situations and a discussion of those issues follows. Even though most of the cases were
decided before Vgil, a comparison of these
decisions with the Vigil analysis suggests
that the conclusions reached remain valid.
911 Calls
The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed statements made during 911 calls
and adopted a case-by-case analysis of

No

-etmn

S

taeet

Even though Crawford eliminated the widely used Roberts testwith regard to testimonial hearsay, the decision did not affect the use of that test when non-testimonial hearsay was at issue.' In
People v. Compan, 2 the Colorado Supreme Court held3 that Roberts still applied with full force to
non-testimonial hearsay offered against the accused.
Roberts requires courts addressing the admissibility of non-testimonial statements to determine whether the statements: (1) bear sufficient indicia of reliability by falling within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception"; or (2) were made by an unavailable declarant and bear "particularized5
4
guarantees of trustworthiness." Colorado essentially adopted Roberts in People v. Dement
however, Dement did not explicitly abandon the unavailability requirement for statements falling
6
within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.
1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2. People v.Compan, 121 P.3d 876, 882 (Colo. 2005).
3. Id.
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1983).
5. People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983).
6.

Compan, supra note 2 at 885.
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whether such statements are testimonial.44 This analysis is used to assess the in-

tent of the caller-specifically, whether
the caller made the call for the purpose of
getting help or for the purpose of providing information for investigative purposes.45 The court concluded that the statement at issue was not testimonial because
"the caller was seeking immediate help
for the victim; the circumstances were exigent; and the statement ... was neither

elicited by nor made to anybody with authority."46 It is unlikely that this result

will be affected by Vigil, as Vigil also employed a case-by-case analysis that ultimately focused on the objective intent of
the declarant.
Colorado's approach to 911 calls is consistent with the majority ofjurisdictions
that have addressed this issue.47 Some of
these courts employ a case-by-case approach that limits the admission of statements made during 911 calls to those
statements that qualify as excited utterances. 4

Courts that have not adopted a case-bycase approach to 911 calls have adopted
different per se rules. Some courts have
held that statements made in a 911 call
are never testimonial. The rationale of this
approach is that Confrontation Clause
concerns are not present, because the purpose of the 911 call is "to obtain assistance, not [to] make a record against
someone."49 Other courts have held that
all 911 calls are testimonial. These courts
reason that a declarant making a 911 call,
regardless of the circumstances surrounding it, should reasonably expect that the
50
statements will be used prosecutorially.
This issue soon may be resolved. The
U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorariin Davis v. Washington,51 a decision
that employed the case-by-case analysis of
911 calls that has been adopted by the
majority of other courts.

Excited Utterances
The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed the issue of an excited utterance
made to a friend of the declarant. In Cornpan v. People,5' the Court held that such
statements, at least in the factual context
presented, were non-testimonial, because
an objective person in the declarant's position would not think his or her informal
statements to a friend would be used at
trial.m
The Colorado Court of Appeals has addressed the more difficult issue of excited
utterances made to a police officer. In People v. King,5 the court adopted the case-

2006
2006
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by-case reasoning of other courts and held tally different approach, disregarding the
that where the victim made an excited ut- excited nature of the statement and interance to a police officer in a non-custodi- stead focusing on the objective expectaal setting without indicia of formality, the tions of a witness in similar circumstatement was not testimonial. 55 Presum- stances who is not excited.'
ably, the same analysis would be applied
to the statements of declarants who were Other Statements to Police
not crime victims.
No Colorado case directly addresses the
In making this determination, the court appropriate classification of other types of
reviewed the formality of the statement statements made to police officers first reboth with regard to the setting where it sponding to a crime scene. In Vigil, howwas made and how it was elicited. 56 It was ever, the Colorado Supreme Court indiimportant to the court that the statement cated that there is a presumption that
was not made in a police station or given statements made to a police officer are
in response to police interrogation. Addi- testimonial: "[o]rdinarily, if a law enforcetionally, the court reviewed the state of ment official is involved during the course
mind of the declarant, noting that the of questioning, such questioning would be
classification of a statement as an excited considered a "police interrogation." 64
utterance supported the conclusion that it
There are at least three approaches that
was non-testimonial. Because the victim have been taken by other state and federal
remained under the stress of excitement, courts. One approach has been to classify
the court concluded that it was not rea- responses made to police questions as per
sonable to believe that the declarant be- se non-testimonial. The rationale for this
lieved the statement would be used later approach is that the police are not gatherat trial.51 It is unlikely that this analysis ing the declarant's statements for use at
will be affected by Vigil, because this trial but rather simply to assess what has
analysis reviewed the question of whether happened at the crime scene.6
the statements were made as a result of
A second approach taken has been to
police interrogation, and also focused on adopt a bright-line rule that all statethe objective intent of the declarant.
ments made to police officers engaged in
This case-by-case approach means that the initial inquiry of what happened are
practitioners must carefully evaluate the per se testimonial. The rationale is that
facts surrounding the making of any ex- the police officer's involvement indicates
cited utterances. The startling event giv- to the declarant that the statements will
ing rise to an excited utterance often di- be used prosecutorially.66
minishes a declarant's ability to recognize
The most common approach seems to
the legal ramifications of the state- be a case-by-case analysis of the specific
ments-an awareness that otherwise
would render the statement testimonial.
To determine whether this concern has
been sufficiently addressed, some courts
evaluate whether a reasonable person in
the declarant's circumstances appreciated that the statements were being gathered for trial and that the declarant had
the capacity to make a testimonial statement. 58 Other courts consider the intent
59
of both the declarant and listener.
Courts that follow this approach reason
that even though the declarant of an excited utterance ordinarily will lack the
awareness that the statement may be
used for trial, the interrogating officer
may have this motivation. 60
Not all courts use a case-by-case approach. Some courts have held that excit-1
6
ed utterances are per se non-testimonial.
The rationale behind this approach is that
these statements are made in response to
the startling event, rather than in response to interrogation or in anticipation
of trial.62 Other courts take a fumdamen-

circumstances surrounding the interaction between the declarant and police officer.67 Often, the analysis asks whether a
reasonable witness in the declarant's position would believe his or her statements
would be used at trial. 68Factors the courts
have considered include:
* the identity of the declarant
* why the declarant spoke to the police
" who initiated the exchange
" the location where the statements
were made
" the declarant's emotional state
* the officer's purpose in contacting the
declarant
" whether
the statements were record9
6

ed.

Some courts have held that the intent of
the listener, the police officer in these cases, is the most important consideration. 0
Practitioners should be aware that this
issue also may soon be resolved. The U.S.
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana,7 1 a decision
that addressed the interplay between police interrogation and "testimonial hearsay."

Statements by Children
The Vigil case involved a child's statements to a doctor, to the child's father and
his father's friend, and to police. The Colorado Supreme Court applied the previously described two-part analysis to determine whether the child's statements
were admissible. The first step of the
analysis asks whether the statements fall
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within the four categories of testimonial

To determine whether this type of interviewer is acting as an agent of the pochild's statements to the police fell within lice, the trial court should review the purthe police interrogation category and pose of the questioning. In Vigil, the Court
were thus considered to be testimonial cited with approval decisions that statehearsay. The child's statements to his fa- ments were testimonial, and therefore not
ther, his father's friend, and the treating admissible, when the interviews by a nondoctor did not fall within any of the four police officer were conducted to gather evcategories. The Court therefore employed idence for trial. 79 For example, a statethe second half of the analysis, which ment to a social worker who was present
asks whether the statements fall within with a police officer and held the police reany of the three formulations of testimo- port in her hand as she questioned a child
nial hearsay described in Crawford-the has been deemed testimonial.80
relevant formulation in Vigil was whethTo determine the understanding of an
er an objectively reasonable person in the objective person in a child's position, Colodeclarant's position would believe that his rado courts engage in a case-by-case
or her statements would be used at a lat- analysis. Vigil provides a list of several
factors drawn from other cases. These facer trial.
Answering this inquiry requires an tors include: (1) the declarant's age; (2) the
analysis of both the extent to which gov- declarant's awareness of government inernment officials were involved in produc- volvement; and (3) the declarant's awareing the statement and the purpose of the ness that the defendant faces
the possibil81
questioning. 73 When police are involved in ity of criminal punishment.
producing the statement, the government
In reviewing these factors, courts have
involvement is great and it is likely that looked at the presence or absence of statethe court will find that interrogation oc- ments by the children indicating that they
curred. 74 This is consistent with prior understand the consequences of their reColorado decisions holding that video- sponses to the questions.8 2 For example, a
taped statements by child witnesses to po- child's response that a defendant should
lice investigators in forensic interviews are "go to jail" indicated that the child undertestimonial. 75 Conversely, child witness stood the statements would be used for
statements made to a parent or family prosecution purposes, and the statements
76
friend likely will not be testimonial. Most were testimonial.8 3 The absence of any
courts have held that some governmental such statements has been used as eviinvolvement is required for the statedence that the child did not have aware77
ments to be classified as testimonial.
ness that the statements may be used latThe analysis is more difficult when the er at trial.8 4 Courts also have considered
child's statements are made to doctors, so- what the child has been told by the intercial workers, or forensic interviewers, for viewer. The fact that an interviewer indiexample, because these persons are not cated that the child also would need to
automatically classified as government of- talk to a "friend" of hers who worked at
ficials in the same way that police officers the district attorney's office to put the deare so classified. Vigil focused on whether fendant in jail for a long time played a
these individuals were acting as "agent[s] part in the Court's decision that the statements were testimonial.85
of the police." 78
evidence defined by Crawford.72 The
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Courts often require that there be some
government presence before they will find
that the objective person in the child's position would know the statements will be
used for trial.8 6 Only a few courts have
recognized that children who make accusatory statements without the presence of
a government official may understand
87
that they are "essentially tattling."
Other Statements
Statements made by a crime victim to
her training manager have been deemed
not testimonial in nature. The court of appeals reasoned that the statements were
not made to police, and there was nothing
that indicated that the training manager
was acting as an agent of the police.8 This
reasoning is consistent with the analysis
subsequently adopted in Vigil.
Crawforditself specifically noted that it
does not apply to business records or coconspirator statements.89 The Court held
that these statements are not by "their
nature" testimonial. 90 Since this opinion,
courts have struggled with what documents should be included within the business record exception.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held
that public records are analogous to business records and should not be considered
testimonial. 91 Further, the affidavits by
judges and court clerks that accompany
the public records-in this case, records of
prior convictions-do not implicate the
Sixth Amendment because their sole purpose is to verify chain of custody and authenticity, not to provide ex partetestimony

92

Other courts have applied similar rea93
soning to admit immigration records,
medical records, 94 or certification records
for machines used to measure intoxication
levels.95 Even though it could be anticipated that some of these reports may be used
in court, they are non-testimonial because
they are used for foundational purposes,
not as substantive evidence of a particular
offense--evidence that would fall within
the Sixth Amendment's prohibition of evidence "against" the defendant. 6
There has been some debate as to
whether laboratory reports should be admitted under a business records rationale.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that
Crawford does not apply to laboratory
and scientific reports.9 7 This approach also
has been followed in many other state
courts.98 However, other courts have de-
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termined that laboratory reports are a
combination of testimonial (the report
writer's opinions) and non-testimonial
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(routine, factual, descriptive, and non-analytical) statements.9 It has been argued
that these reports fit within the various
formulations of testimonial evidence
when they were prepared with the reasonable expectation that they would be
used at trial.' 0
The classification of dying declarations
also is unsettled. Crawfordacknowledged
that some dying declarations can be classified as testimonial statements, but stated that even these statements may be admissible.10 1 The Court did not decide
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporated an exception for dying declarations, 10 2 but did recognize that the exception for dying declarations pre-dated the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment and
has been considered "a general rule of
criminal hearsay law."10 3 Lower courts

have reached opposing conclusions on this
issue, 1 4 and no Colorado court has addressed the issue.
Post-Crawforddecisions have held that
statements made during plea allocutions
and in front of grand juries are testimomal.' 0 5 In People v. Couillard,l

6

the Colo-

Conclusion
Like any other two-year old, Crawford
is growing and changing. Although it is
possible that the U.S. Supreme Court
might impose significant changes on the
principles of Crawford,it seems more likely that the basic contours of the rule will
remain the same, and that courts will continue to flesh out the precise boundaries
of the rule. Because new decisions are being issued on a weekly basis, counsel must
make sure to stay up-to-date in this area
of law before litigating the issues raised
by Crawfordand its progeny
NOTES
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